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“Northern Lights:” An Assessment of the Political and
Economic Challenges Facing North East England in the
Context of Greater Scottish Autonomy
Keith Shaw
Department of Social Sciences, Northumbria University, Newcastle, UK
ABSTRACT
Drawing on recent research on the Anglo-Scottish border, this
article examines the social and economic impact of a more
powerful Scotland on its “nearest neighbors” in the North East of
England. In examining a series of competing narratives that shape
how the significance of the Anglo-Scottish border and
borderlands have been understood, the discussion begins by
highlighting the longevity of a traditional conflictual narrative that
a more powerful Scotland will undermine the North East’s
economic fortunes. The article will further consider the strength of
a competitive narrative by capturing how North East reactions to
the independence referendum north of the border have been
used as a springboard to argue for greater powers to be devolved
to the North East itself— and has led directly to a new generation
of “Devolution Deals” being offered by the UK Government to the
English regions. Thirdly, the article will examine how the
discursive space created by the referendum campaign (and
outcome) has created the conditions within which a collaborative
narrative—highlighting how Scotland and the North East of
England have a shared history and common social and economic
challenges—has emerged. The article will conclude by
considering whether the emergence of a new cross-border
relationship between the “Northern Lights” allows the Anglo-
Scottish border to be conceptualized more as a “bridge” than a
“barrier,” particularly given the UK’s recent decision to leave the EU.
Scottish independence represents a real threat to the region. If Scotland gets tax powers and
offers lower corporation tax it could mean that firms leave the region and move north of the
border. (John Shipley, former Leader of Newcastle Council, quoted in Schmuecker, Lodge,
and Goodall 2012, 4)
The growth of a strong economic power in the north of these islands would benefit every-
one – our closest neighbours in the north of England more than anyone. There would be a
“northern light” to redress the influence of the “dark star” (London) in rebalancing the
economic centre of gravity of these islands. (Alex Salmond MSP, quoted in The New Sta-
tesman March 5, 2014)
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Introduction
Almost overnight, the whole dynamic of the relationship between Scotland and the rest of
the UK has fundamentally changed. Despite the triumph of the “No” vote in the Septem-
ber 2014 referendum, and the subsequent offer of more economic and fiscal powers to
Scotland by the UK Government, it is hard not to view—as somewhat complacent—the
Westminster Government’s immediate-post referendum assumption that Scottish inde-
pendence has now “been removed from the political agenda for a generation” (The Guar-
dian September 19, 2014). Indeed, the size of the “Yes” vote in the referendum (45% of
voters—1.5 m Scots—wanted to leave the UK), the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) stun-
ning electoral performance in the UK General Election in May 2015 (House of Commons
Library 2015) and their continued criticism of the UK Government’s “limited” devolution
offer (as defined the 2016 Scotland Act) have all ensured that the issue of, even greater,
devolution to Scotland remains firmly on the political agenda. In addition, the momentous
decision by the UK (as a whole) to leave the EU following a referendum in June 2016, was
not shared by the people of Scotland who voted strongly to remain in the EU. For the Scot-
tish First Minister and her government, this clearly constitutes the “significant and
material change of circumstance”—that they argued after the 2014 referendum—would
justify calling a second referendum on independence. In October 2016, First Minister of
Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon MSP, duly announced plans for a second referendum on an
independent Scotland (BBC 2016).
Inevitably, the developing momentum of Scotland’s case for devolution/independence
has served to reopen debates about the growing divergence between the wide range of
powers likely to be available to the Scottish Government in Edinburgh and the more
limited powers initially allocated for the devolved administrations in Wales and Northern
Ireland and, in particular, the very limited powers available for sub-national interventions
within the localities and regions of England itself (Cabinet Office 2014). One such area of
England—where the likelihood of greater Scottish autonomy has become a major political
issue—is just across the border, in the North East of England, Scotland’s nearest neighbor
or “cousin” (Fraser 2012).
Such close “cousins” have much in common, including a shared history, daily cross-
border flows of people, for work, shopping or family visits, and common experiences of
economic and social change.
Indeed, the North East has also taken heart from Scottish experiences of devolution in
the past. In the 1980s and 1990s, the campaign for a Scottish assembly positively influ-
enced the development of the campaign to set up a directly-elected assembly for the
North East. Even though the proposal to create a regional “Parliament” was eventually
rejected by North Easterners in a referendum held in 2004, the Scots views on the need
for greater devolution, democracy and civic engagement left their mark on subsequent
political debates in the region (Tomaney 2005).
As noted in the Introduction to this special edition, despite geographical proximity and
a number of shared features, the past relationship between Scotland and the North East
has also been characterized by conflict and contestation. Any quick historical glance at
cross-border relations for most of the early modern period (between the 11th and 16th cen-
turies) would capture the many conflicts and battles between the rival kingdoms of Scot-
land and England to settle territorial disputes. The “bloody” borders were also the site of
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cross-border raids and skirmishes between powerful families—the Border Reivers
(Crofton 2015).
Despite over 300 years of peace following the Treaty of Union in 1707, it is noticeable
that these historical themes of conflict and collaboration still operate as an influential nar-
rative within which the North East has understood—and interpreted—the contemporary
rise of a much more powerful Scotland. Albeit one that in the modern era sees the agenda
being more about economic competition than military conquest.
Thus, in the run-up to the 2014 referendum, both political and business leaders in the
North East of England became increasingly concerned that if Scotland gained greater
control over the levers of economic development, and for example, become significantly
more attractive as a location for inward investment, this would be to the detriment of
the North East who would lose out in the battle for foreign direct investment. There is
also a distinct lack of trust between politicians on both sides of the border. As Iain
McLean argues elsewhere in this journal, North East Labour MPs in particular, have
been long opposed to a more powerful Scotland, to Scottish nationalism more generally
and to the SNP in particular. This animosity was well developed even before the wipe-
out of the party’s electoral base in Scotland in the 2015 General Election when the SNP
won 56 out of 59 seats in Scotland, including 40 of Labour’s 41 seats.
However, while there is a strong sense in the region that a resurgent Scotland poses a con-
siderable threat to economic development south of the border, there are others in the North
East (including politicians and business leaders) who are genuinely interested in using the
opportunities afforded by the radically altered circumstances north of the border, to
examine areas where greater cross-border collaboration would be of mutual benefit. Follow-
ing the September 2014 referendum, the businessman chairing the North East Local Enter-
prise Partnership—set up in 2011 to promote private sector-led economic growth in the
region—highlighted how his meeting with the Scottish Government’s Minister for Energy,
Enterprise and Tourism, Fergus Ewing MSP, saw them identifying a number of key areas
where they both have a common interest. In short, “this is about two key economic
regions working together to improve the economic growth prospects for its people” (Paul
Woolston, quoted in North East Local Economic Partnership Review 2014).
The Scottish Government has also been keen to emphasize that a more powerful Scot-
land would not only maintain close ties with the North of England, but that this would
lead to new opportunities for collaboration and joint-working. During the referendum
campaign the, then, Deputy-First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon looked forward to:
An independent Scotland having a relationship of friendship and co-operation with all our
neighbours in these islands, including our next-door neighbours in the North of England.
(quoted in, The Journal January 8, 2014)
In examining the wide-ranging implications of greater Scottish autonomy for the cross-
border relationship between Scotland and the North East of England, this article draws
on the empirical ﬁndings of two recent research programs on this theme (Shaw et al.
2013, 2015).1
This article reflects the approach to the study of borders initially discussed in the intro-
duction to this special edition that recognizes, inter alia, the material and symbolic impor-
tance of borders, their capacity to both divide and connect and the need for their meaning
to be constantly redefined and reconstructed in contemporary time and place. In doing so,
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the article locates recent policy debates on Anglo-Scottish cross-border relationships
within the context of—often deeply-rooted—border “narratives” which serve to shape
and influence how the contemporary border is interpreted and understood. Such
border narratives are best viewed as an amalgam of “personal and collective ideas” and
are also “representations of places” (Lauren 2012, 42). As Holt argues in her contribution
to this volume, such narratives are also an important component in the forming of identity
—particularly in the borderland communities of Scotland and northern England where
the contemporary “memorialising of historic, regional events and customs continually
rehearse a borderland identity which acquires particular meanings at different times
and for different groups and individuals” (Holt, forthcoming). This echoes Berger’s
view that, “within national histories, borderlands play an important role’ as it is at the
border that the national defines itself most rigorously” (Berger 2009, 497).
Three particular narratives are identified in this article, each firmly rooted in history,
capturing both a sense of place and people and offering often competing contemporary
visions of the nature of the Anglo-Scottish border, cross-border relationships and the sig-
nificance of the borderland communities. These narratives—of the Conflictual, Competi-
tive and Collaborative border—can also be located within O’Dowd’s seminal discussion of
appropriate border metaphors which capture the “enduring importance of borders as well
as their complex, ambiguous and often contradictory, nature” (O’Dowd 2001, 6). Particu-
larly relevant to this discussion is the contrast between borders as “bridges” or “barriers:”
the former capturing notions of collaboration, co-operation and co-existence, the latter,
reflecting division, conflict, and difference.
In examining these narratives, the discussion will, firstly, examine the contemporary
strength of the traditional conflictual narrative that a more powerful Scotland will under-
mine the North East, particularly in relation to the economic fortunes of an English
region that still faces major challenges in promoting economic growth. The article will
then consider the competitive border and chart how the independence referendum north
of the border has been used as a springboard to argue for greater powers to be devolved
to the North East. In the next section, the article will examine how the discursive space
created by the referendum campaign (and outcome) has created the conditions within
which a collaborative narrative—highlighting how Scotland and the North East of
England have a shared history and common social and economic challenges—has
emerged. The article will conclude by considering whether the emergence of a new cross-
border relationship between the “Northern Lights” allows the border to be conceptualized
more as a bridge than a barrier, particularly given the UK’s recent decision to leave the EU.
The Conflictual Border
If a new settlement gives powers to Scotland which are seen as contributing to the long-term
prosperity of Scotland, parts of the UK (for example the North-East) are likely to become
very ill at ease with this settlement. (Royal Society of Edinburgh & British Academy 2015, 53)
Bloody battles between the two kingdoms and cross-border cattle raids organized by rival
Border families, are—fortunately—a thing of the past. However, the border’s violent (and
militarized) past has served to inform a contemporary narrative that stresses not just
difference or separation but enmity and conﬂict. While the basis of more recent conﬂict
is powers and resources, rather than cattle, family honor, or land entitlement, it has
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noticeable that attempts to lure the same multi-national to locate on either side of the
border has been referred to as a “battle” and generating “fear” (BBC December 9, 2012).
The animosity is both economic and political. Thirty-seven years before the 2014 Refer-
endum, North East Labour MPs helped undermine the then Labour Government’s unsuc-
cessful attempt to set up a separate Scottish Assembly. In helping to vote down the 1977
Parliamentary bill on devolution, they then voted to introduce a very challenging (and ulti-
mately unachievable) requirement in the new bill that a minimum of 40% of the electorate
had to vote “Yes” in the referendum. At the time, North East politicians were furious that
despite the region being poorer than Scotland, “… public spending in the region was
lower, not higher, than in Scotland”, and that giving the Scots their own devolved assembly
“would add insult to injury” and would merely serve to “entrench Scotland’s advantage”
(McLean, Gallagher, and Lodge 2013, 186).
The 1970s also saw the creation of the Barnett Formula, a fiscal mechanism which had
the effect of awarding greater levels of public expenditure per capita to Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland than to England (see the discussion on the Formula in Mclean’s
article in this volume). The operation of the funding formula has been the cause of a
long-standing grievance in northern England due to the consequent advantages that Scot-
land enjoyed in relation to public expenditure allocations. Figures suggest that through
this calculation, Scots enjoy a £733 per capita advantage over North Easterners (BBC Sep-
tember 24, 2014b). For North East businesses, “The Barnett Formula is an anachronism
that leads to an entirely un-strategic distribution of resources and investment between
different parts of the UK” (North East Chamber of Commerce [NECC] 2014, 2).
In evidence to the 2009CalmanCommission (onScottishDevolution), the business organ-
ization, the NECC, expressed their concern over any further devolution of fiscal responsibil-
ities to the Scots that would allow them to gain advantage over the North East through
lowering taxation rates north of the Border (NECC2009). Indeed, prior to the announcement
of the 2014 referendum, many political and business leaders in the region were already very
concerned about the existing advantages enjoyed by the administration in Edinburgh. For
example, it was strongly felt in the region that Amazon’s decision to invest in Scotland—
rather than in North Tyneside—was heavily influenced by the £1.8m subsidy provided to
the company by Scottish Enterprise (Schmuecker, Lodge, and Goodall 2012).
However, it was the UK Government’s decision in 2012 to allow the Scots to vote on full
independence that really stoked-up feelings in the North East and saw niggling concerns
become full-blown anxieties.
While not all were taken-in by scare stories that independence would lead to border
guards and passport controls (Daily Telegraph October 31, 2013), three particular
worries were widely held. Firstly, that an independent Scotland would reduce the rate
of Corporation Tax—by up to three percentage points—which would reinforce their com-
petitive advantage with regard to inward investment. Secondly, that an independent Scot-
tish Government would reduce or abolish Air Passenger Duty (APD) and that this would
have implications for the North East’s main airport in Newcastle. Thirdly, if an indepen-
dent Scotland was not permitted to join a currency union with the rest of the UK, would
North East businesses trading with Scotland suffer from any variation in exchange rates
and from the potential administrative costs of dealing with two different currencies?
Some of these concerns were certainly overplayed. In practice, the room for manoeuver
for an independent Scotland to cut taxes would be limited by the scale of the recession, EU
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regulations on state spending, and the level of spending required to support the extensive
welfare state in Scotland (McLean, Gallagher, and Lodge 2013). However, for a range of
stakeholders in Northern England, such attitudes are rooted in genuine anxieties and as
such, are hard to dismiss. They are also reinforced by the feeling that the North is in an
uncomfortable position, caught between an increasingly confident neighbor north of
the border—poised to secure greater power and influence—and a prosperous and power-
ful London, led by its own directly elected mayor.
It is not surprising therefore, that on the morning of September 19, 2014, many political
and business leaders in the North East breathed a collective sigh of relief when voters in
Scotland rejected independence. However, this feeling didn’t last for long, as the rec-
ommendations of the Smith Commission, and subsequently, the UK Government, con-
firmed greater fiscal devolution on the rates and bands of income tax, Air Passenger
Duty, the Aggregates Levy, and assignment of VAT revenues (HM Government 2015).
For the North East Chamber of Commerce, there was a general concern over the lack of
any post-referendum consultation with North East—the region most likely to be affected
by a more powerful Scotland. More specifically, there was hostility over the continuation
of any form of the Barnett Formula (in a context where the Scots would be given greater
powers to run their own affairs) and a rejection of “devolving duties which could impact
upon consumer behaviour such as air passenger duty” (NECC 2014). Granting the Scot-
tish Parliament powers to abolish APD at Edinburgh airport remains a particular concern:
The Chief Executive of Newcastle Airport has estimated that 1,000 jobs could be at risk in
the region and £400 million drained from the region’s economic output in the next 10
years (The Northern Echo February 25, 2015a).
The momentous events of 2014–2015 have also sharpened cross-border political hos-
tilities. Even before the SNP effectively wiped-out the Labour Party in Scotland in the
May 2015 General Election, there was no love lost between the Nationalists and Labour
MPs in the region. Given that one leading North East MP (and former Labour Govern-
ment minister for the North East), Nick Brown, had expressed his “hatred of both nation-
alists and nationalism” before the General Election result, it is perhaps not surprising that
Nicola Sturgeon’s post-election rallying call, that a more powerful SNP group at Westmin-
ster would back North East plans for greater investment in road and rail infrastructure,
was treated with a large measure of contempt by North East Labour politicians in particu-
lar (The Chronicle April 26, 2015). During the 2015 General Election campaign, there was
also anger fromNorth East Labour politicians that the Conservative Party had been able to
use such overtures to raise the specter of the SNP propping-up an Ed Miliband-led Labour
Government as leading, amongst other things, to the decommissioning of Britain’s nuclear
deterrent and the granting of another independence referendum in the near future (The
Guardian April 9, 2015).
Above all, there has been a genuine fear that the “wipe-out” of Labour north of the
border will mean an erosion of traditional allegiances to Labour in its one remaining heart-
land, the North East of England. A major concern is that the move away from Labour (par-
ticularly in the older industrial areas of the West of Scotland) is less about pro-
independence sentiments and more a rejection of the “austerity” agenda and an acceptance
that the Labour Party no longer provides a clear vision of the more equal society that Scots
wish to live in (Shaw 2015). While the May 2016 elections to the Scottish Parliament saw
the SNP remain the governing party—albeit without an overall majority and reliant on
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support from The Green Party—the Labour Party’s decline continued, with the party losing
13 MSPs and being pushed into third place by a resurgent Conservative Party who more
than doubled their number of MSPs (The Independent 2016). For the North East of
England, the considerable unease that the question of full independence had not been
settled “once and for all” has been borne out by the First Minster’s determination that:
Scotland will have the ability to reconsider the question of independence and to do so before
the UK leaves the EU – if that is necessary to protect our country’s interests. So, I can confirm
today that the Independence Referendum Bill will be published for consultation next week.
(Nicola Sturgeon, MSP, quoted in BBC October 13, 2016)
The Competitive Border
Scotland’s capacity for policy flexibility is in marked contrast to those of English regions, for
which devolution is extremely limited and tightly controlled by Whitehall… . Further extend-
ing this without ensuring English policy much more effectively considers the conditions of all
regions would be damaging to the North East. (North East Chamber of Commerce 2014, 2)
The granting of additional powers to Scotland has also produced a more pragmatic and
instrumental response in the North East: one that has used the Scottish experience to
lobby the UK Government for more powers for the region so as to allow competition
to take place on a more level playing ﬁeld. As with other border narratives, there are
clear historical parallels. Writing about the medieval and early modern periods,
Tomaney notes, that the development of the North East was heavily shaped by its “pos-
ition in the hinterland of the Scottish border” and that:
The threat of invasion from the North and distance from the South, conditioned the socio-
economic development of the region and its political identity. Frequently, the threat of inva-
sion was more theoretical than real – but the region’s political class became adept at painting a
picture of Scottish threats as a means of guaranteeing political autonomy and fiscal privilege.
(Tomaney 1999, 78)
Much more recently, in the 1980s and 1990s, political developments north of the border
were also used as a benchmark against which the far more limited powers of the North
East could be represented in negotiations with the UK Government. The earlier campaign
for a Scottish assembly directly inﬂuenced the development of the case for a directly-
elected assembly for the North East—although voters subsequently rejected this option
in a regional referendum in 2004 (Tickell, John, and Musson 2005).
In considering such asymmetry between powers and resources available on the different
sides of the border, it is also important tonote that the likelihoodof an evengreater imbalance
in the powers and resources available on either side of the border has come at a timewhen the
English regions no longer have their Regional Development Agencies. These powerful
quangos possessed considerable resources and institutional capacity, were abolished by
the CoalitionGovernment in 2011 and only partially replaced by the muchmore geographi-
cally and financially circumscribed Local Enterprise Partnerships (Pugalis and Bentley
2013).
The demand for greater devolution of powers within England generally, and specifically
to the North East, formed a key component in the region’s responses to both the Refer-
endum and to the recommendations of Smith Commission—set up by the UK
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Government after the referendum result to bring forward proposals for greater devolution
to Scotland (The Smith Commission 2014). One leader of a major North East Local Auth-
ority felt that:
It is now time to have a full debate about the devolution of power throughout the UK. If
additional funding is guaranteed to meet the needs of Scotland it is reasonable to ask that
funding is also guaranteed to meet the needs of northern England in areas such as transport
and the economy. (Councillor Simon Henig, Leader of Durham Council quoted in The
Northern Echo September 20, 2014)
North East Businesses also called for greater regional control over areas such as planning,
housing and skills (NECC 2014), while a poll in 2014 suggested that people in the North
East were the strongest supporters of handing more powers to local areas in England. In
this survey—commissioned by the BBC—85% of people in the North East region favored
handing powers over tax, policing and education down to more local decision-makers
(BBC November 5, 2014a).
The widespread support for more powers to be devolved to the North East in the light
of further Scottish devolution has also chimed with the UK Government’s “Devolution
Deal” approach—within England—through which new Combined Authorities are to be
created. This approach to devolution sees several adjoining local authorities coming
together in a larger grouping, led by a newly-created office of a directly-elected mayor,
and requesting greater devolution from central government. The areas to be devolved
include economic development, regeneration, housing, transport, skills, the integration
of health and social care, aspects of children’s services, land development and planning,
policing, control over the fire and rescue services, and retaining locally the surplus gener-
ated by business rate growth (National Audit Office 2016).
Through this deal-making process, the seven individual councils in the North East area
are planning to join together—as the North East Combined Authority (NECA)—in order
to have such a devolution bid agreed by the UK Government. The new body was to cover
the local council areas (both urban and rural) of Northumberland, Durham, Newcastle,
Sunderland, Gateshead, North Tyneside and South Tyneside and requested greater
powers and resources in a number of areas (Figure 1).
The proposed creation of a new combined authority partly reflects the outcome of
pressures on the UK Government to provide a devolution “dividend” to the regions
and sub-regions of England in the light of greater powers to Scotland. In addition,
however, it represents a response to more long-term concerns about a political system
in the UK that has traditionally been viewed as excessively centralized compared to
similar European nations. Hence, in the UK, the proportion of tax set at local level is
equivalent to only 1.7% of GDP, compared to nearly 16% in Sweden, 15% in Canada,
nearly 11% in Germany and 6% in France (Martin et al. 2016).
This strengthening of the powers available to the North East of England—and the cre-
ation of larger political bodies—are likely to be important contributors to a more balanced
relationship with Scotland, a “stateless nation” (Law and Mooney 2012) that has its own
parliament, political executive, First Minister, legal, educational and religious systems.
Particularly important to challenging existing cross-border asymmetries in powers is
the potential creation of a single mayoral executive who will be directly elected to speak
for the NECA. The creation of such a political role offers the possibility that whoever
8 K. SHAW
speaks for the North East region in any negotiations with the Scots has a suitably broad
mandate, a greater range of powers and is thus able to enjoy at least a measure of
parity with Scottish politicians (Fenwick and Elcock 2014).
The devolution of greater powers has been viewed as a necessity by some political
and business leaders if the North East is to be able to compete on a “level playing
field” with Scotland for resources, jobs and inward investment. According to the
Chair of the Federation of Small Businesses in the North East, speaking just after the
SNP’s triumph in the May 2015 General Election “There is a real danger for this
region in the concessions the Scots are now going to get…we need to shout loudly
to ensure the Government consider what the implications are south of the border”
(Ted Salmon quoted in The Northern Echo May 9, 2015b). However, it is also noticeable
(See Figure 1) that one of NECA’s devolution requests is that the new body is able to
have the flexibility, in a number of areas, in order to facilitate a more collaborative
approach with Scotland. It is to this issue that we now turn.
The Collaborative Border
We are so used to being governed by the South East that we have tended to forget just how
much we have in common with the Scots in terms of our social and economic challenges. If
we could forget that imaginary line on the map, we would see benefits from cross-border co-
operation. (North East Local Government Officer, quoted in Shaw et al. 2013, 20)
In examining the potential for cross-border collaboration, what is noticeable is the lack of
previous collaboration (particularly in relation to economic development and social
Figure 1. A More Powerful North East: The Devolution Deal for the North East Combined Authority.
Source: HMT & NECA (2015).
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policy) between geographically proximate areas. In the author’s research (Shaw et al.
2013), one former senior regional civil servant in the North East noted that in over 10
years in his previous role, he had only one meeting with Scottish civil servants. While
another North East participant felt that the regions former Development Agency (abol-
ished by the Coalition Government in 2011) didn’t engage with Scotland and focused
purely on things to the south. Similarly, a Scottish stakeholder “found collaboration
with the RDAs hard… you got a warm welcome but not much genuine desire to work
together” (Shaw et al. 2013, 24). Economic development ofﬁcers from the local authorities
adjacent to the border also reported that there was little cross-border collaboration, and
that this was felt to be almost inevitable owing to differences in funding regimes and
initiatives. Where cross-border engagement did take place, it had tended to be sporadic,
often dependent on individual initiative, and oriented around speciﬁc projects or issues
(see the discussions of the Border Visions initiative in Frank Peck’s contribution to this
special edition and in Pike 2002).
In this sense, the Anglo-Scottish border (although an “internal” border within the UK)
has served more as a barrier than a bridge (McCall 2011). Partly, this can be explained by
the level of policy asymmetry caused by the previous devolutionary initiatives in Scotland,
partly by the lack of political interest shown on both sides of the border, and also by the
North East’s traditional antipathy towards Scottish nationalism and the SNP.
However, the referendum campaign—and its outcome—marked a step change in the
relationship between Scotland and North East England. The renewed focus on the
nature of the Anglo-Scottish Border during—and after—the referendum campaign has
served to strengthen a narrative that highlights the many common social, economic
and political bonds between North East England and Scotland. Looking back on the
last decades of the 20th century, one former Labour MP for a Scottish constituency
looked back on an era when:
Scotland and the north-east stood together against the poll tax and pit closures. People recog-
nised then, as we do now, that any political change that we hope for can be reached only
through the unity of shared identity and interests. (Gordon Banks, MP, quoted in
Hansard March 4, 2014: Column 213 WH)
This collaborative narrative has allowed political and business leaders (on both sides of the
border) to consider how joint working could be of mutual benefit within a centralized
polity and unbalanced economy dominated by London and the wider South East. A key
part of this shift is the emergence of an approach, that accepts the inevitability of economic
competition, but which also highlights how the changed circumstances can lead to new
forms of cross-border working. As one business representative has argued:
There are concerns over the way Scotland might use greater powers. Lower corporation tax is
one possibility, while reduced air passenger duty could have an impact on our international
flights. But… there are at least as many opportunities as threats that come from being on
Scotland’s doorstep. We are each other’s nearest market and have much more to gain
from improving trade across the border than from a scramble for marginal competitive
advantage. (Ross Smith, Policy Officer, North East Chamber of Commerce, quoted in The
Northern Echo August 29, 2013)
This emphasis echoes the direction of travel in Europe, where the Organization for Econ-
omic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has argued that policy interventions tend
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to ignore the fact that economic and innovation ties often span regional administrative
borders (including international borders) which limits the potential of many border
regions. Hence, the policy focus should move away from competing with neighboring
areas for particular opportunities, to co-optition which involves collaborating across
borders in the face of external competition: “The real competition is global; therefore,
neighbouring regions may need to engage in ‘co-optition’ – co-operation for competition”
(OECD 2013, 12–13). From this perspective, borders become, “opportunities for inno-
vation rather than barriers to ﬂows of people, goods and knowledge” (OECD 2013, 19).
The politicians running local councils on either side of border are also increasingly seeing
the benefits of cross-borderworking.Thedifference in approach canbe characterized in terms
of a distinctionbetweenwhat Peck (in this volume) has referred to as a “far border” area (com-
prising the wider north east and north west of England) and a “near border” area defined in
terms of the travel to work, shop and study area immediately adjacent to the border.
In terms of the former area, one issue under discussion is the opportunities for intro-
ducing high speed rail between Edinburgh and Newcastle. This is particularly important,
as many in the region are concerned that the North East is unlikely to directly benefit from
the UK Government’s existing high speed rail proposals within England. As Newcastle’s
council leader acknowledged in the context of talks with Edinburgh city council leaders,
“It is as important for us to be connected to Scotland as it is for us to be part of the
route to London, and we need to bear that in mind” (Councillor Nick Forbes, quoted
in The Journal January 25, 2013). Opportunities for dialogue between the North East
and Scotland have also been strengthened by Glasgow joining the UK Core Cities
Group, which now comprises England’s eight largest urban economies outside London
—Newcastle, Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Nottingham and Shef-
field—along with Glasgow and Cardiff (Core Cities 2014).
In terms of the latter, one other example of this new cross-border approach is the Bor-
derlands Initiative which brings together the five local councils nearest the border, North-
umberland, Cumbria, Carlisle, Dumfries and Galloway and Scottish Borders (Figure 2).
While partly influenced by the earlier Border Visions network that met for a short
period in the early 2000s (see the article by Peck in this volume), the more recent Border-
lands Initiative is a product of the contemporary debates on Scottish independence and
has its genesis in the 2013 report, Borderlands: Can the North East and Cumbria benefit
from greater Scottish Autonomy, which was commissioned by the Association of North
East Councils (Shaw et al. 2013). This report captured how the combination of the
debate on Scottish independence, and the continuing search for a post-regional future
for sub-national governance in the North East, provided opportunities to consider new,
creative, cross-border approaches to boosting economic development across the Border-
lands—both on the east and west sides of the borderline.
The Scottish Government was quick to respond to the positive nature of the report, and
particularly highlighted their support for the recommendation:
The practical co-operation which we’re starting to see under Borderlands is – rightly – being
taken forward primarily by local authorities. But any independent Scottish Government
would support it wholeheartedly. This Government, if elected as the government of an inde-
pendent Scotland, will work with local authorities to establish a borderlands economic forum.
And we will nominate a lead minister to work with such a body. (Alex Salmond MSP, quoted
in New Statesman March 5, 2014)
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There was also support from the UK Parliament’s Scottish Affairs Committee in their
report, “Our Borderlands, Our Future” (House of Commons 2015). As part of their
inquiry into the economic future of the Scottish borders, the committee gave its
support to joint-working across the border and recommended that an Inter-Ministerial
Forum (comprising both Scottish and UK Governments) should be set up to add
further support to the work of the Borderlands Initiative.
Crucially, the recommendations of the 2013 Borderlands report were positively
received by the five councils on both sides of the Border. This resulted in: three meetings
of council leaders being held in 2014–2015; the creation of a Borderlands Steering Group
to develop the approach further; and the commissioning of additional research to establish
an evidence-base upon which to identify the sectors and projects that would benefit from a
Borderlands approach.
For the councils concerned, there is a clear case for collaboration on the basis of a
refashioned Borderlands economic area:
. The council areas are similar on many economic and demographic indicators and, by
extension, experience similar economic problems.
. They all have a large proportion of their populations living in rural areas, which provide
challenges in relation to accessibility, connectivity with regards broadband and mobile
infrastructure, transport infrastructure, and the economic future of market towns.
Figure 2. The Borderlands Local Councils. Source: ONS: Counties and Unitary Authorities (2009).
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. There are particular problems with low level of wealth creation, low pay, a lack of rep-
resentation of high growth economic sectors, the outmigration of young people, and an
ageing population.
However, collaboration is not just about tackling problems but also about making the most
of the Borderland’s considerable assets:
. The area has a population of over one million people and incorporates almost 10% of
land area of Great Britain.
. There are high levels of self-employment in the area and the growth in micro and small
businesses are opportunities which could be exploited.
. There are also opportunities to develop energy production, both on and off shore, and
adding value to the tourism product.
. Just under 25% of the workforce work in agricultural, forestry and fishing businesses: a
sector that provides a potential opportunity given the change in consumer demands for
higher quality, locally-sourced, produce over mass production.
. The issue of “voice” is also important. The Borderland authorities working together
could add substantial strength to a “northern voice” that embraces Scotland and north-
ern England, in the face of the continuing dominance of London and the South East.
(Source: Shaw et al. 2015)
The Borderlands report also emphasized how the five councils could seek to agree sector-
based collaboration in areas of mutual benefit. In subsequent discussions, the councils
have identified three sectors of strategic importance with growth potential and in which
collaboration could add value.
. Tourism is a significant sector for all of the economies and communities in the Border-
lands. It builds on the region’s key natural assets, is a major employer, and offers lin-
kages with other areas of the local economy. It is also recognized that the sector is
currently limited by fragmented tourism operations and administration and that
there is considerable scope to develop common marketing themes and opportunities
across the Borders.
. Another key sector is Forestry—the Borderlands contain the largest most productive
and fastest growing forests and woodlands in the UK. Collaboration in this sector
could also include forging relationships between companies including supply
chain logistics and timber transport investment. The sector also provides
significant tourism opportunities such as “Dark Skies” projects in two of the
areas main forests
. The third sector, Energy, offers the potential of building on the areas extensive renew-
ables expertise in onshore and offshore wind energy production, in tidal hydro-electric
and biomass opportunities. This is in addition to the large nuclear power sector based in
the west of the Borderlands and the potential for energy capture and storage.
In early 2016, the local councils and national government bodies involved in the develop-
ment of the Borderlands Initiative began to examine the different strategic and governance
options. Following the recommendations of a second commissioned research report
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(Shaw et al. 2015), it is acknowledged that given the already “cluttered” governance arena,
with a myriad of organizations, a plethora of strategies, and a number of cross-border
asymmetries, it would be more appropriate to view the “Borderlands” collaboration as a
“light-touch” flexible network (rather than a “formal” legal partnership). The network
would serve to: improve cross-border communication; share intelligence; strengthen co-
ordination; bring the right people together to collaborate on specific projects; share
good practice; and, provide for a common voice on issues on mutual concern. To illustrate
this, the report identified 10 potential areas in which the pursuit of a cross-border would
add value or “make sense” (Figure 3).
Such a realistic, common sense, approach also recognizes the undoubted challenges
facing the Borderlands Initiative. As both Peck and Columb argue elsewhere in this
special edition, joint-working across the border will be challenging in areas (such as plan-
ning) where there are major cross-border differences in terms of regulatory systems, legal
frameworks, or variations in funding regimes. Where programs are already up and
running, it is important that any separate Borderlands approach does not lead to overlap
or have a “displacement” effect. The Borderland authorities are—necessarily—leading on
their own, council-specific, developments and other collaborative initiatives which would
clearly impact upon their use of the vehicle of Borderlands. For example, a number of econ-
omic development objectives may be more fruitfully pursued through other mechanisms
such as Combined Authorities, “City Deals” (O’Brien and Pike 2015), or via direct relation-
ships with national government departments on both sides of the border.
For the North East of England, the political “space” created by the clearing away of the
English regional institutions after 2010 has encouraged consideration of new and flexible
place-based approaches to economic development that may not have been possible under
the old geography and structures. It also reinforces the importance of the political dimen-
sion in creating and reshaping economic boundaries and can provide a response to a situ-
ation where functional economic geographies fail to map on to the institutional structures
that policymakers propose and form (Pugalis and Bentley 2013, 8).
Conclusion: The Anglo-Scottish Border—Bridge or Barrier?
This article captures a border undergoing a process of “rebordering” which will radically
alter the nature of the Union between the two countries set up in 1707. Gone are the days
Figure 3. Ten Collaborative Opportunities in the Anglo-Scottish Borderlands. Source: Shaw et al. (2015, 5).
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when the Anglo-Scottish border was regarded as a relatively unimportant “internal”
boundary within the United Kingdom. In the next few years, additional devolution and
the impact of UK exit from the EU will further re-enforce the divergence between the
two, and potentially push the UK further down the road towards a more federal political
system in which the English regions, Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland become much
more autonomous. Indeed, the momentous events of the last two years may even prefigure
the eventual break-up of the United Kingdom into separate states with different relation-
ships with the rest of Europe.
Such changes have profound implications for Scotland’s relationship with its “close
cousins” across the border in the North East of England. In analyzing the changing
nature of cross-border relations the article has focused on three border narratives based
on “conflict,” “competition” and “collaboration” which both capture different contempor-
ary perspectives on the nature of border change and draw upon customs, traditions, and
representations of place that are deeply rooted in border history.
Such narratives clearly offer different interpretations of the implications of border
change. The conflict narrative captures a clear sense of “difference” and embodies a
zero-sum view—from many in the North East—that their region’s economic fortunes
would suffer if Scotland had even greater fiscal and economic powers. The competition
narrative is less hostile and more pragmatic—using the granting of more powers to Scot-
land to highlight the urgency of devolving real powers to the constituent parts of England.
A more positive narrative, stressing the common bonds and shared traditions between
Scotland and the North East, highlights how a region that has traditionally spent its
time looking “south” for support and encouragement, should now look “north.”
Finding common causes and collaborative opportunities has been the impetus behind
the Borderlands Initiative, where council leaders in the five local authorities adjacent to
the Border, an area of 10% of the UK and more than one million people, are working
to create a partnership to ensure greater cross-border economic collaboration and to
make a more effective case for “Devo Borders.” The desire to work with the Scots—and
see the Anglo-Scottish border more as a “bridge” than a “barrier”—is in keeping with
the spirit of the times. Crucially, this route also offers real opportunities for the North
East to redefine itself, to rediscover its identity and, crucially, to find its collective voice.
However, more recently, the UK’s decision to leave the EU has further compounded
the contestability of border narratives by potentially leading to an outcome which
leads to a “Yes” vote in a second referendum on an independent Scotland. In turn, the
desire—North of the border—to remain in the EU, offers the possibility for a new inter-
national border between two separate countries (one in the EU and one outside). Such an
outcome creates considerable uncertainties for any attempt to develop a new relationship
between Scotland and the North East of England. One particular concern is that a number
of the collaborative opportunities across the “borderlands” are in areas such as rural
development, farming, tourism and renewable energies, in which continuing EU invest-
ment and support are vital. Nor is the prospect of a “hard” Anglo-Scottish border with
passport checks and currency converters likely to appeal to those crossing the border
on a daily basis for work, shopping or family visits; while the likelihood of different
tax or even currency regimes will make it much harder for cross-border economic
business linkages and activities. The prospect of an emboldened and empowered North
East—ready to talk to Scotland on a more equal basis—may also has also receded after
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the referendum result, as North East council leaders concerned that without EU funding
several of the key features of the devolution deals would be hard to implement are begin-
ning to question the merits of a combined authority model more generally (The Chronicle
2016).
A timely reminder perhaps, that “dominant” border narratives are not fixed, but subject
to constant reinterpretation and reshaping in the context of profound political social and
economic change. In such a context, the appropriateness of the “bridge” or “barrier”meta-
phors to illustrate the changing nature of the Anglo-Scottish border is likely to remain
highly contested and contingent—a symbol of the growing importance of examining
the boundaries between “stateless nations” in border studies.
Endnote
1. Methodological Note: This article draws upon a variety of sources. These include original
research commissioned by the Association of North East Councils and Cumbria County
Council. The two reports, Shaw et al. (2013) and Shaw et al. (2015), include both quantitative
and qualitative data and a series of policy recommendations. The author also had access to
internal policy documentation from the relevant organizations. The theoretical and concep-
tual insights in the article draw upon presentations and discussions within the ESRC-funded
Seminar Series, Close Friends? Assessing the Impact of Greater Scottish Autonomy on the
North of England. Given the contemporary—and rapidly evolving—nature of the issues
under examination, the article draws upon largely factual information located within a
number of websites, including specialist news organizations (such as the BBC), the UK Par-
liament and UK Government departments. The views contained in the article are those of the
author and not of any of the commissioning organizations.
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